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Abstract: The current debate in corporate taxation is focussing on leveling the tax
playing field within the European Union in order to allow companies incorporated in
different countries to face the same competitive conditions. However, various
elements of corporate tax rules may discriminate against companies registered in the
same country but having different sizes or operating in different sectors. Using the
micro backward-looking approach to compute effective tax rates for eleven European
countries, the US, and Japan, this paper shows that there could be some concerns
regarding domestic tax discrimination since some sectors and sizes enjoy significantly
more favorable tax burdens.
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4Introduction.
In October 2001, the European Commission issued a Communication on
company taxation in the European Union1, which explored various avenues to tackle
tax discrimination of cross-border activities in Europe. The rationale behind this
Communication is that the existence of tax obstacles may prevent the completion of
the Single Market. Because of tax discrimination of cross-border activities, there is a
credible threat that investment would be channeled based on tax consideration instead
of on pure pre-tax economic returns. In its report, the European Commission
confirmed the wide differences across countries in terms of effective taxation of
different types of investment, using different sources of financing. As much as being a
source of investment misallocation, differences in effective corporate tax rates are the
symptoms of tax discriminations. This is because in a world without tax
discriminations, effective tax levels should tend to converge under the effects of tax
competition.
Whilst one should acknowledge the tremendous importance of cross-border
discrimination issues, the debate would gain even more consistence by enlarging its
scope to domestic discriminations. The complexity and diversity of tax rules, the
variety in levels of enforcement, the tax incentives offered to some types of
enterprises or the existence of special tax regimes are various elements that could
cause discriminations at domestic level between firms operating in different sectors or
having different sizes2. Although the 1992 Ruding report found that corporate taxation
in the EU was mostly neutral with respect to companies' size, there is some evidence
of an unbalanced distribution of the tax burden across different types of companies. In
a pioneer study using financial statement information from companies located in
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Collins and Shackelford
(1996) found some evidence of differences in average effective taxation across
different sectors, as well as between multinational and domestic-only companies.
Focussing on the situation of Germany, Italy, and the UK, the European Commission
(2001a, p. 264) found that, although specific tax rules for SMEs lower their effective
tax rates, these companies bear a higher tax burden than multinationals investing
                                                
1 "Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles", COM(2001)582.
2 Although the Report contained some measures of tax burden for different sizes of companies in
selected countries, domestic discriminations were not specifically covered in the 2001
Communication, as the mandate of the European Commission was to focus on cross-border issues.
5abroad. Nicodème (2001) computed effective corporate tax rates using individual
accounts of companies for different sectors and sizes and found large differences
across these two features within countries. Focusing on Belgium, Valenduc (2001)
found that implicit tax rates generally increase with the size of the firm and varies
across sectors of activity, but did not find a significant interaction between these two
characteristics. However, these results may actually be dependent on the composition
effects of the samples, and a more systematic and in-depth approach seems to be
welcomed. The objective of this paper is to use information derived from financial
statements to determine whether there are significant differences in the tax burden of
companies having different characteristics. This paper also differ from previous
studies as it uses harmonized financial accounts and a larger set of countries.
In the remainder of the paper, section one briefly presents the methodology used
to compute effective corporate tax rates. Section two looks into tax measures
discriminating against or in favor of some sectors or sizes, and presents effective
corporate tax rates for 1999. Finally, section three uses pooled cross-sectors and time-
series data to assess sector and size effects on effective corporate taxation.
Conclusions follow.
1. Methodologies to compute effective corporate tax rates.
Following the classification used in Nicodème (2001), three main
methodologies can be identified in the economic literature to compute effective
corporate tax rates. The macro backward looking approach uses aggregated
macroeconomic data to produce ratios of corporate tax burdens (see e.g. Mendoza et
al. 1994, 1997). Because it uses aggregate ratios, this method generally does not offer
in-depth analysis of specific sectors or of the role of size. The Micro forward-looking
studies (see e.g. European Commission, 2001a) has the theoretical possibility to
include elements of tax differentiation for sizes or sectors such as different tax rates.
However, because of its theoretical approach, this method cannot take into account all
the elements of the tax system without generating complicated models. In addition, it
usually does not include specific elements such as tax enforcement, rulings, share-
buybacks, the treatment of inventories, value adjustments, the carry of losses, and
other specific tax regimes that may be more favorable for some types of companies.
This is why the Communication of the European Commission (2001a) confers a role
on micro backward-looking methodologies in order to approach the issue of
6differences in effective taxation for different types of enterprises. This category of
methods uses financial accounts of companies and incorporates the effects of the
macro-economic context, the behavior of the company and of the tax authority, as
well as all features of the tax system. Although fitted to differentiate the effective
rates across sectors and sizes, these methods cannot however isolate specific
characteristics of the tax system nor can they disentangle the interference of foreign
and domestic tax systems on the tax burden. Nevertheless, they constitute a
reasonable approach to assess what the Communication of the European Commission
(2001a) has labeled “equity issues” across companies. In the third section of the
paper, we use effective tax rates computed with such method to isolate these effects.
The choice of an appropriate indicator to compare effective corporate taxation
across countries, sectors and sizes is not an easy task. The desired indicator should
provide a measure of the tax burden that takes into account most of the characteristics
of the tax system. In addition, the choice of the indicator should minimize any
possible systematic correlation with a particular sector or a particular size. The
obvious ratio would be the tax accrued on profit before taxes. This indicator  does not
seem to introduce major measurement errors linked to companies’ characteristics.
However, its informational content is relatively poor as it does not provide a measure
of preferential tax treatments given via the computation of the tax base. At the margin,
this indicator should be equal to the statutory tax rate. Therefore, the economic
literature using micro data3 includes other indicators in the analysis. The use of the
turnover in the denominator allows to annihilate all differences in accounting
practices. However, as noted by Collins & Shackelford (1996, p. 55), this rate
implicitly assumes that the true profit margins are constant across countries,
industries, and sizes. Using the gross operating profit in the denominator - that is the
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and other value adjustments - has the
advantages to take into account the effects of interest and depreciation on determining
the tax base; to be relatively comparable across countries and companies; and to avoid
having to assume similar profitability across firms. Nevertheless, it can introduce a
bias toward capital-intensive sectors, which have a relatively large share of
depreciation in the profit and losses accounts. Driven by these considerations, we
present both the tax accrued on the gross operating profit and on profit before taxes.
                                                
3 See for example, Collins & Shackelford (1996) or Buijink et al. (1999).
72. Tax treatment of different sectors and sizes.
Levying taxes to finance government expenditures is a main activity of the State
and it requires difficult political arbitrage. In this context, it is not surprising that tax
policy might, here and there, aim at favoring some categories of taxpayers for
efficiency or equity reasons. This section reviews a non-exhaustive list of examples of
tax measures intended for some sectors or sizes, or whose implementation leads to
equivalent effects.
Measures intended for specific sizes.
There are multiple reasons why companies of different sizes may bear different
tax burdens. As pointed by Buijink et al. (1999, pp. 28-29), small and medium size
companies are major contributors to employment in developed economies4. As a
consequence, promoting entrepreneurship through start-up companies has
increasingly become a major objective for the EU Member States, in the context of
the objectives set in 2000 in Lisbon to make the EU the most competitive economy in
the world. To that aim, favorable tax treatment for small companies is therefore
plausible.
The most obvious preferential tax treatment linked to size is the existence in
some countries of progressive corporate taxation systems. For instance, statutory rates
vary in Belgium from 28% to 41%, depending on the level of profit5. Luxembourg has
adopted a similar system. In other occasions, such measures can also be used as part
of regional development policies, as in Portugal where corporate taxation is reduced
for companies that accept to relocate to the center of the country, provided that their
turnover is inferior to 30 million escudo. The incentives based on tax rates are often
accompanied by specific tax deductions for investment made by SMEs, as is for
example the case in both Belgium and Portugal. As a last example, capital allowances
are offered by the United Kingdom for SMEs' expenditures on plant and machinery.
Large companies, because they may have sizeable economic influence, may
however have more power to negotiate favorable tax treatment, either alone or
through professional unions. In the Netherlands, it is for instance possible for
investors to obtain tailor-made rulings with the tax authorities when they operate on
                                                
4 In the EU, SMEs account for 99.8% of companies, 66% of total employment, and 54% of turnover
(European Commission, 2001e, p.16)
5 Subjected to restrictive conditions (among others on ownership and on dividend policy).
8an international basis and invest more than 10 million Gulden (about € 4.5 million) in
the Dutch economy.
Measures with implicit effects on specific sizes.
Rulings and tax bargaining with fiscal authorities, before or after the
determination of the tax liability, are not exceptional events. The practice of rulings is
common in the Netherlands, and the Belgian government makes it an essential
element of its current corporate tax reform. If large companies would a priori seem in
a better position to bargain with tax authorities, such activity may however not always
be beneficial as firms that bargain may be imposed larger-than-necessary tax
compliance costs if they fail to conclude an initial agreement. Slemrod and
Blumenthal (1993) estimated tax compliance costs in the US to be around 3.2% of tax
revenue in 1993. From a survey of existing literature, the European Commission
(2001a, pp.74-76) estimates tax compliance cost for large EU companies to be
between 2 and 4% of tax revenue. There is also evidence that these costs relative to
tax paid decrease with the size of the company but increase with the level of foreign
activities6. A positive relationship between company’s size and tax compliance costs
is seen as a ‘regulatory failure’ (see OECD 1994). Such a relationship, documented in
European Commission (2001a, p.739), gives a rationale for measures favoring SMEs.
Ideally, tax compliance costs should be taken into consideration when assessing the
tax burden. Taxpayers with identical revenues but with different estimates of tax
compliance costs may bear different tax burdens if their different perceptions of the
worthiness of pursuing tax engineering lead to different decisions with regards to
these practices. It is also sometimes argued that large companies might suffer from
higher tax burdens because tax authorities more closely watch their actions. The issue
of tax enforcement may clearly play a role in the level of effective taxation. In 1999, a
new regulation (Law 549/95) came into force in Italy, which required taxpayers
whose income laid below the sector’s standards to justify these discrepancies. This
new rule is said to have considerably ameliorate tax collection for self-employed and
SMEs.
The multiplication and complexity of tax rules give also ways to possible tax
loopholes. Because they don't always have the abilities to deploy fiscal engineering
                                                
6 Some empirical evidence from Belgium also indicates SMEs may bear a comparatively higher tax
administrative burden than large companies. Taxation represents on average about 32% of total
administrative burden for Belgian companies (Bureau du Plan, 2000).
9resources to avoid taxation, small companies probably suffer most from multifaceted
tax regulations. As they involve countries with different tax rules, cross-border
operations fall into this category of activities with tortuous tax implications. The
multiplicity of tax rules and practices provides companies operating at international
level with possibilities to legally decrease or avoid taxation. However, in the same
time, the lack of cooperation between some tax authorities may as well put additional
burden on these companies by double taxing some activities. The European
Commission (2001a) has identified a number of rules and practices in tax systems that
may emerge as obstacles to cross-border activities because they introduce additional
tax or compliance burden.
The existence of fifteen different sets of rules in the European Union faced by
companies operating in more than one country is clearly one of these. More generally,
whereas most trade agreement are multilateral, double tax conventions are in most
cases, if not all, bilateral (Whalley, 2001). This raises the problem of inconsistency
across countries or, in some cases, the absence of provisions to avoid double taxation.
Tax treaties usually focus on providing relief from double taxation of dividends,
interest, and royalties payments by ways of exemption or imputation. In the European
Union, payments of interest and royalties between associated companies located in
different Member States are still potentially subject to taxation, as the proposal for a
directive on a common system of taxation is still pending7.
Cross-border payments of dividends is covered by the "Parent-subsidiary
directive"8, which exempts from withholding tax the distributed profit from a
subsidiary to its foreign parent, provided that this latter directly holds a minimum of
25% of its capital. The Member State of the parent company should either exempt the
dividend from corporate taxation or offer a tax credit to the parent company. Although
the opinion of EU companies on the Directive is positive, the European Commission
(2001a, p.303-5) notices that its narrow scope in terms of legal incorporation of
companies that may benefit from the system as well as in terms of holding threshold
necessary to qualify for the exemption, may restrict the beneficial effects of the
                                                
7 After the 1996 ECOFIN meeting in Verona, the Tax Policy Group chaired by Mario Monti decided
to link this issue to those of the taxation of savings and the code of conduct on business taxation.
This "tax package" should ease the negotiation process as the multiplicity of issues offers more
rooms for compromises between Member States. The proposal is to exempt these interest and
royalties payments from taxation when the parent has a direct or indirect holding of at least 25% in
the subsidiary.
8 Directive 90/435/EEC.
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directive. The report of the European Commission also points out problems related to
a lack of consistency in its implementation, as it seems that some Member States
subject the availability of tax exemption to conditions that are not contained in the
Directive.
Similar problems arise with the application of the merger directive9, which
provides for the deferral of corporate taxation on cross-border restructuring
operations. The existence of a threshold in terms of holding has per se the potential to
create discrimination between companies. It is not obvious to draw a direct
relationship between these provisions on holding and the size of companies. However,
the level of the threshold and the nature of these operations suggest that the rules may
be more likely to concern large companies. These latter have indeed the capacity to
ensure, if necessary, a substantial enough holding in order to benefit from the tax
exemptions. This would be detrimental for small companies as, below the threshold,
the dividend may be taxed, exempted, or imputed depending on each Member State's
legislation. As indicated by the European Commission (2001a, p. 376), the technique
of imputation may actually disadvantage small companies because, under the
threshold, tax credit will usually only apply to dividends distributed at the domestic
level. Large companies can bypass this by pursuing relatively complicated practices
such as dividend stripping10, which are not easily available for small corporations.
Among obstacles to cross-border activities, the limits on cross-border loss
relief may be burdensome for multinational corporations, since although all countries
allow carrying forward (or carrying back) losses at the domestic level, such relief
remains problematic at the international level11. The existence of loss relief is
particularly important for new companies, which are likely to suffer losses the first
years of operation. Such possibility is therefore presumably particularly welcomed by
SMEs, if the assumption that new firms have a smaller size turns out to be true.
The last cross-border obstacle identified by the European Commission are the
transfer pricing issues. Following international conventions (e.g. OECD Model
                                                
9 Directive 90/434/EEC.
10 A "dividend stripping" is a transaction wherein the buyer buys a share just before the distribution of
dividends, receives this dividend as tax-free income and resells the share at a lower value. The
buyer receives a tax-free dividend and books a capital loss on the sale of the share, which decreases
its taxable income.
11 All EU Member States authorize the carry-forward of losses, the number of years varying from five
to an unlimited period. Six Member States – France, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden
and the United Kingdom - offer some possibilities to carry-back the losses (see European
Commission 2001a, pp.89-128).
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convention), cross-border intra-group operations have to be based on the "arm's length
principle" and "separate accounting principle"12. The rationale behind the concept of
arm's length is to register operations between affiliated parties on the same basis as if
these parties were independent. This should avoid profit-shifting strategies, for
instance from high-taxed countries to low-taxed ones. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2002)
found that, at the margin, more than 65% of the additional tax revenue from a
unilateral tax increase is lost due to a decrease in the reported income tax base.
Similarly, Altshuler and Grubert (2001) found evidence that US companies carry out
profit-shifting activities through financial planning such as investment in passive
assets, investment in high-tax affiliates, and the use of multiple tiers13.
Transfer pricing is a complex topic. Broadly speaking, two problems of
different nature arise. First, comparable transactions are not always available so that
there is some latitude for accounting certain assets, such as intangibles. Rules and
practices also differ from one country to another, leading to possible income shifting
to countries with more favorable legislation. Second, tax authorities sometimes
require onerous transfer pricing documentation, implying a high compliance cost for
enterprises. To conclude on transfer pricing, large multinational corporations may
have rooms to decrease their taxes provided that this income shifting is not offset by
too high compliance costs.
The profit-shifting behavior can be part of a broad definition of tax planning if
we don't stick to a 'negative' classification limited to tax evasion, be it illegal such as
fraud, or legal such as channeling complex financial arrangements through financial
intermediaries. There are reasons to believe that international tax planning or
optimization is more easily available for large corporations than for small ones.
Indeed, the conditions set to benefit from special regimes are often restricted to
minimum levels of size or turnover, which makes these advantages de facto only
reachable by large companies. For example, the favorable regime of coordination
centers for headquarters under Belgian tax law was subject to restrictive conditions
among which were the requirement to be part of a group of companies, to have a
                                                
12 This latter means that "each affiliated company in a group is for tax purposes treated as a separate
entity and taxed individually on the basis that it conducts business with other group members at
arm's length" (European Commission, 2001, p. 332).
13 See Grubert and Slemrod (1998) for a good review of literature and additional evidence on income
shifting.
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consolidated turnover of at least 10 billions Belgian francs (i.e. 250 million euro) and
a consolidated capital of at least one billion BEF, and to be international14.
Finally, there may also be a link between the size of enterprises and some tax
measures for listed companies. For instance, Greece had in a recent past a different
statutory corporate tax rate for listed and unlisted companies, respectively set at 35%
and 37.5% in 2001 (Bronchi, 2001). Similarly, Italy offers a lower Dual Income Tax
for newly listed companies, up to three years after being listed. If there is no clear
direct relationship between being listed and the size, the main reason for being listed -
raising additional funds - may be a characteristic of growing companies achieving a
critical size.
Measures intended for specific sectors.
Targeted tax measures towards specific sectors are more difficult to implement,
essentially because competition law normally precludes it. However, such measures
related to direct business taxation may be allowed within the European Union if
properly notified to and deemed compatible by the European Commission. Measures
of technical nature (e.g. depreciation rules) or pursuing some worthy policy objectives
(e.g. exemptions for R&D) may be considered as State aid15 but benefit from a
derogation and are therefore compatible with EU rules. In addition, some
discretionary administrative practices or some benefits reserved for certain types of
undertakings may well be considered as State aid.  Tax measures considered as State
aids fall into two categories16 and can take the form of tax credits, tax allowances, tax
exemptions, specific rates, or deferred tax provisions.
Table (1) indicates the tax measures considered as State aid by the EU
authorities (European Commission, 2001c). The interpretation of these figures should
be done cautiously since, first, they include multiple horizontal objectives as diverse
                                                
14 This last criteria was met when three cumulative conditions were fulfilled: at least four subsidiaries
were located in four different countries abroad, at least 500 million BEF (or 20% if more) of the
consolidated capital was registered in foreign subsidiaries, and at least 5 billion BEF (or 20% if
more) of turnover was raised by subsidiaries abroad.
15 Following the notice issued by the Commission (1998b), a tax measure will be termed 'State aid' -
within the meaning of article 87 EC (formerly 92 EC) - if it meets four cumulative conditions: (a) it
reduces the firm tax burden (by ways of reducing the tax base, the amount of tax to be paid, or by
rescheduling the tax liability), (b) it is granted by the State or through its resources, (c) the measure
affects competition between Member States, and (d) the measure is specific or selective as it favors
certain companies or the production of certain types of goods.
16 State aid is classified in four main categories labelled from A to D. A refers to aid transferred in full
to the recipient; B concerns aids in the form of public intervention through equity participation; C
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as the promotion of R&D, the protection of environment, support to SMEs,
employment and training aids, and concern diverse sectors, and, second, they don’t
include favorable tax measures not considered as State aid.  The third row of Table (1)
indicates total State aid in the form of tax measures by adding tax State aid aimed at
the manufacturing and services sectors to those offered to agriculture, fisheries, and
regional aid objectives. Tax State aid varies from zero in Austria and Spain to .55 and
.78 percentage point of GDP, respectively in Ireland and in Portugal. It is interesting
to notice that State aid to SMEs in the form of tax measures is the exception rather
than the rule. In the European Union, aid to SMEs actually most often takes the form
of grants and subsidies given directly to the recipient, or offered as soft loans (i.e.
with generous repayment terms). Furthermore, other measures undertaken in favor of
small companies (e.g. lower rates for SMEs) may simply not qualify as State aid.
There are of course typical examples of tax measures directly targeted at some
sectors. Greek shipping companies with Greek flags were exempted from corporate
taxation. Ireland had a special 10% corporate tax rate for companies selling goods
manufactured in Ireland. In other cases, similar measures were coupled with
conditions on the location. It was for instance still the case in 2001 in the Greek
prefectures of Attica and Thessaloniki, in the Shannon airport zone in Ireland, or in
the free-trade zones of Madeira and the Azores. Such measures have been listed in the
report of the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation. This code of conduct is a non-
binding peer review by which Member States aim, at political level, at avoiding any
measures involving harmful tax competition. The code includes evaluation and
monitoring procedures and applies to measures having or being likely to have a
considerable effect on the location of economic activities in the Community. Despite
the absence of consensus on the final report, approximately 280 measures have been
listed in the report as potentially harmful17, among which 66 measures were
designated as “most harmful”. This peer review leads to a double process of standstill
                                                                                                                                           
relates to aid in the form of interest saving; finally, D covers guarantees. Tax measures fall into
subcategories of A and of C.
17 Potentially harmful measures are assessed in the light of five criteria: (a) whether the advantages are
reserved to non-residents, (b) whether they are ring-fenced (i.e. they are specific to mobile
activities), (c) whether they are granted in the absence of any real economic activity, (d) whether
the rules to compute the tax base depart from generally internationally accepted principles, and (e)
whether the measures lack transparency.
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(i.e. promise not to introduce new harmful measures) and rollback (i.e. eliminate
harmful measures) of harmful tax measures18.
Measures with implicit effects on specific sectors.
Finally, some measures that are not specifically targeted at some sectors may
nevertheless have similar effects. For instance, the introduction of a tax credit for
companies investing in new technologies may benefit most new sectors of the
economy. More generally, sectors exhibit substantial differences in the structure of
their assets so that depreciation rules are likely to have differentiated effects across
different industries. The sector of transport, for instance, has a sizeable part of its
assets in the form of tangibles such as vehicles. In the light of the report of the
European Commission (2001a, pp.546-48), there are large differences in methods
allowed (straight line or declining balance), as well as in the rates.
Effective corporate tax rates for different sectors and sizes.
These theoretical differences are confirmed by the real-life data. For example,
Table (2) indicates 1999 effective corporate tax rates based on gross operating profit
for different sectors for small and large companies respectively. As for small
companies, the non-weighted average tax rate of the sample varied in 1999 from
13.7% for energy and water to 22.1% for services, whilst the rates for large companies
went from 11.8% for the utilities up to 18.9% for the companies in the sector of trade.
Comparing different sizes within the same sector also brings substantial differences in
effective tax rates, which can be interpreted as an indication of implicit
discriminations across firms with different characteristics.
To determine whether these dissimilarities were significant, we undertake
statistical tests on differences in means over the period 1990-1999. The results are
reported in Tables (3) and (4). As a first step, we compare the means in effective
taxation between large and small companies operating within the same sector. In a
second stage, we look at the differences in means across sectors for companies with
comparable size. For the first test, the null hypothesis, which assumes that means are
equal across sizes for a specific sector, can be rejected at 5%-level for the two sectors
of 'transport and communications', and 'services' when using the effective tax rate
                                                
18 The report should be finalized by the end of 2002, although some measures may run until end of
2005 when they should stop their effects. However, the ECOFIN agreed on a derogation stating that
they may decide to extend the effects beyond 2005 on a case-by-case basis and under particular
circumstances.
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based on the gross operating profit, and for the sector of trade for the indicator based
on profit. For the second test, the null hypothesis that means are all equals across
sectors for a specific size can be rejected for both small and large companies with the
first indicator but failed to be significant with the second, due to the extremely high
dispersion of the rates in this later case.
Some caveats should obviously be made on the interpretation of these results.
First, these differences are not consistently biased towards the same sector or the same
size across countries. Second, although the hypothesis of equal average effective
taxation is rejected in several cases, this exercise does not provide indications on the
causes of such differences. Indeed, these can for instance be due to different effects of
accounting practices across sectors - such as depreciation rules - because the structure
of assets may differ from one industry to another. Alternatively, the differences in
effective taxation may also be dependent on specific temporary sector conditions such
as the economic cycle. To identify these causes, one needs to control for the structure
of financial accounts. This analysis is the purpose of the last section.
Relationship between turnover, gross operating profit and taxes
From appendix A, we see that BACH database gives both the gross operating
profit and taxes as a percentage of turnover. Schematically, the gross operating profit
(GOP) is the turnover (TURN) minus some variable costs (VC) and some fixed costs
(FC)19. Variable costs are linked to turnover via a positive relationship, modeled here
as a coefficient α  ( )10 ≤≤α .
( ) FCTURNGOP −−= α1      (1)
Tax accrued (TAX) is computed by applying the statutory tax rate (t) on net
profit before taxes, which is the difference between the gross operating profit and
depreciation of fixed assets and interest payments (DI).
( )DIGOPtTAX −=  (2)
Dividing (1) by TURN and deriving by TURN, we find a positive concave
relationship between the ratio of gross operating profit on turnover and turnover.
( )
02 ≥=∂
∂
TURN
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TURN
TURN
GOP
    ;  
( )
02 32
2
≤−=
∂
∂
TURN
FC
TURN
TURN
GOP
              (3)
                                                
19 Alternatively, one could consider fixed costs to be only reflected in depreciation and interest
payments. In this case FC would simply be equal to zero and the only change would be equation (3)
where no relationship between profitability and turnover would appear.
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Substituting (1) in (2), and sequentially dividing and deriving by TURN, we
find a similar relationship between the ratio of tax on turnover and turnover.
( ) ( ) 02 ≥+=∂
∂
TURN
DIFCt
TURN
TURN
TAX
   ; 
( ) ( ) 02 32
2
≤+−=
∂
∂
TURN
DIFCt
TURN
TURN
TAX
        (4)
More interestingly, a similar relationship exist between the ratio of tax on
gross operating profit and turnover, indicating that large companies (i.e. with larger
turnover) should normally bear a higher effective tax rate. This relationship should be
stronger in sectors with high levels of depreciation and interest payments.
( ) ( ) 01 2 ≥−=∂
∂
GOP
tDI
TURN
GOP
TAX
α     ;  
( ) ( ) 012 322
2
≤−−=
∂
∂
GOP
tDI
TURN
GOP
TAX
α               (5)
The relationship between the effective tax rate and GOP (measured in % of
TURN) is quite similar. Profitability increases the ratio of effective taxation and this
relationship is larger, the higher the level of depreciation and interest in percentage of
turnover.
( )
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                (6)
Turning to the effective tax rate on profit, its theoretical measure is t, the
statutory tax rate, and is independent of both the turnover and the level of profit.
3. Domestic discriminations in corporate taxation.
This section examines the empirical relationship between effective corporate tax
rates and different structural variables theoretically influencing the tax burden. The
analysis of equity issues in effective corporate taxation starts with the following
estimating equation:
ijktiiktkjtjijktijktijkt CSIZESECTCONTROLETR εββββα +++++= 4321
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where ETRijkt is the log of our measure of effective corporate taxation in
country i’s, sector j and size k, for year t. Next, CONTROLijkt are a set of control
variables from the profit and loss accounts, some of them being in logs20, which are
included in some regressions. SECTjt and SIZEkt are zero-one dummies respectively
flagging the sector and the size. Following the classification of the BACH database,
six main sector classifications are estimated and the size of the companies can be
'small', 'medium', or 'large' depending on the turnover, the level of capital, or the total
assets21. Sectors and sizes are being interacted in some regressions. Further, αt  is a set
of time-varying constants, whilst Ci are the country dummy variables. Finally, the β's
are vectors of coefficients, and εijkt is an error term. All regressions use pooled cross-
section data and include unreported time fixed effects. The sample period is 1980-
1999.
The results of the regressions are reported in Table (5). Regressions (1)-(3)
contain the effective corporate tax rate defined as tax accrued on gross operating
profit as the dependent variable, whereas regressions (4)-(5) use the ratio of tax
accrued on profit before tax instead. To correct for possible time mismatch in the
allocation of tax accrued due to later corrections and carry-forward of losses, the
dependent variable in regressions (3) and (5) is the ratio of the total tax accrued for
year t to t+2 on the corresponding tax base for those 3 years. Their results confirm
those of regressions (1) and (4). Furthermore, regression (2) includes the level of
value adjustments - including depreciation-  as well as interest paid, both in
percentage of turnover. This is done to correct for the measurement error that could
arise when using gross operating profit. Indeed, possible differences across sectors in
terms of the structure of the costs may bias the indicator in favor of capital-intensive
industries, even in the case of equal profitability. Finally, the regressions include
sector and size dummies variables to identify the possible differentiated treatments.
Table (6) contains comparable regressions with size and sector variables interacted.
The results suggest significant differences in effective corporate tax rates across
sectors and sizes. An unreported analysis of the relative contribution of company
characteristics in regressions (1) and (4) shows that sectors explain about 30% of the
variance if gross operating profit is used in the denominator of the dependent variable,
                                                
20 See appendix A for data sources and definitions and appendix B for summary statistics.
21 See appendix C for a description of the database and the definitions of effective tax rate, sectors,
and sizes.
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whereas this proportion drops to 10% if profit is used instead. Whereas highly
significant in both regressions, size dummies only contribute for about 2-3% in both
cases. The lion’s share in terms of explanatory power comes from the country
dummies, which also capture the statutory corporate tax rate. These country fixed
effects are all strongly significant22 and give interesting insights as they actually
provide a ranking of countries with regards to effective taxation, controlled for sector
and size composition effects. It confirms that Japan, Italy and Germany are high tax
countries, whilst corporations from Sweden and Austria have a significantly lower
corporate tax burden. These results are consistent with other studies using the
backward-looking methodology. It also seems that countries situated in the middle of
the ranking are very close to one another, as shown by the coefficients.
Looking at sectors, 'Energy and water', 'Building and civil engineering',
'Transport and communications', and ‘services’ have, at first glance, significantly
lower effective tax rates than the 'Manufacturing sector' used as the case base,
whereas the opposite may be suggested for ‘trade’. Interestingly, with a few
exceptions, most sectors enjoying lower taxation share the common characteristic of
being industries operating in domestic markets rather than on a truly international
basis. Second, most of them involve a set of activities which are partly or in full
conducted by the public sector and/or receive tax preferential treatment of any form.
The sector of "energy and water" groups mining and extracting activities of coal,
petroleum, natural gas and uranium, with the production, manufacture, and
distribution of energy and water, as well as the collection and purification of water.
From regressions in Table (5) and (6), we conclude that effective corporate taxation is
lower in this sector, whatever the indicator used and the size of the companies. The
high proportion of fixed assets leading to high levels of depreciation may be a
candidate to explain the large negative coefficient when using the ETR based on gross
operating profit. However, this coefficient remains large when profit before taxes is
used for computing the effective tax rate, so that adjustment alone cannot explain
everything. The mining and extracting activities actually include some loss-making
industries, such as coal extracting activities. However, their weight in the total is
probably quite small compared to those of utilities and, as indicated in Table (7), the
                                                
22 The majority of (unreported) time dummies are significant at 5%-level but no clear pattern could be
identified.
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sector displays a relatively high profitability, possibly partly due to economies of
scales in the sector. Following EU directives, electricity and gas industries in Europe
are progressively being liberalized, but this legal process is not yet achieved in most
countries, with a sizeable part of the market still being non-eligible for choosing
freely its supplier. Furthermore, in most countries the incumbents have retained a high
market share and effective competition is still unsatisfactory. Additionally, a lack of
cross-border interconnection capacities and some discriminatory access to national
networks leads to energy markets developing at regional level rather at a truly
European level (European Commission, 2001d). The situation is comparable in the
US with full liberalization of energy applying to a small number of States only.
Because of their statute of former public utilities, these industries have secured in a
large set of countries preferential tax treatment for a significant range of their
activities. In most EU Member States, the distribution of energy is done through
public-private partnerships immune from corporate taxation. These preferential
treatments may well explain the low effective corporate tax rate on companies from
the 'energy and water' sector, in particular for its large companies.
The financial accounts of the sector of 'transport and communications' bear a
high proportion of assets which increases the weight of depreciation. In addition the
sector is relatively indebted. This is revealed by a relatively higher gross operating
margin coupled with a lower profitability before taxes. This category includes sectors
that are often operated by public-owned enterprises or that receive State aid. Some of
these industries display low effective competition such as Postal services or Railways,
whilst some others face more intense competition such as transport by air or by water,
radio and television broadcasting, telecommunications, travel agencies and other
supporting activities. The sector shows lower effective taxation when measured on
gross operating profit, especially for large corporations. When measured on profit, the
effective taxation is only significant when the 3-years average is considered, which
could be an indication of volatile ratios. The results are therefore mixed. One
explanation for the lower tax burden found in some regressions could be, like ‘energy
and water’, the presence of large public corporations in railways or public transport
with favorable tax treatments, a high proportion of fixed assets and a lower
profitability before taxes.
The sector of 'building and engineering' includes the construction works of
buildings and roads, as well as the installation and completion of buildings. We
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conclude from Table (6) that the lower tax burden in that sector only applies to large
companies. This is consistent with the conjecture on the degree of competition. Small
companies in this sectors are often locals operating within a restricted geographical
area with few competitors. Large companies, on the other hand, are involved in public
works that are subject to public tendering. This high degree of competition decreases
profitability, and, subsequently, effective corporate taxation.
The sector of services is more difficult to analyze as it comprised industries as
diverse as maintenance and repair of motor vehicles, real estate activities, research
and development, legal activities, tax consultancy, public administration and defense,
education, cultural activities, etc. Interestingly, the sector has the features of being
relatively more profitable, more indebted, and with a higher proportion of fixed assets.
The results suggest that the sector has a relatively lower tax burden, this advantage
being reinforced the larger the size of the company. Once again, the structural
variables alone cannot explain the tax pattern and the heavy presence of public bodies
in the sample most probably weights on the results.
Turning to size, dummies suggest higher taxation the smaller the company. The
estimated coefficient of 0.205 in column (2) of Table (5) suggests that being a small
company rather than a large one increases effective corporate taxation by about 23
percent. This pattern seems to hold true in each sector. This is an important finding as
theory normally finds a higher effective tax rate for large companies23. In addition,
small companies have a higher leverage ratio and a higher implicit rate of interest on
their debt. This is consistent with the hypothesis of a ‘market failure’ in the financing
of small businesses activities due to asymmetric information and a possible short-sight
of financial markets. However, size does not seem to influence the share of interest
payments in percentage of turnover (and nor the level of adjustments). This situation
could be explained by the large differences in Europe in terms of the structure of the
debt (see European Commission 2001e). Hence, the results suggest that large
companies might be in a better position to reduce their effective tax burden, possibly
through profit shifting, tax planning, fiscal engineering, and/or rulings, as they may
have more opportunities and resources at hand.
                                                
23 The possibility of a sample bias should be diverted. Indeed, if a high share of SMEs are start-ups
making losses in their early years, the aggregation of data will artificially inflate the ratios of
effective taxation. However, the results do not suggest that size could influence profitability before
taxes.
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On the basis of these results, we conclude that there is some evidence of
effective corporate tax differences across sectors and sizes. In other words, even when
controlling for the structure of the financial statements, tax burdens are shown to be
more favorable for large companies and for specific sectors.
Conclusions.
Whilst the current debate in corporate taxation is focusing on obstacles to cross-
border activities to level the playing field for companies operating from different
countries, differences of treatment across enterprises operating from the same country
but in different sectors or of different sizes has attracted lower attention. Domestic tax
legislation contains provisions targeted at specific industries as well as at particular
sizes. Furthermore, other measures applicable in a non-differentiated manner across
companies have the potential to have a larger impact on some types of corporations.
The tax obstacles identified by the report of the European Commission on company
taxation are among those kinds of measures.
Using the microeconomic backward-looking approach, this paper computes
effective corporate tax rates for eleven EU Member States, the USA, and Japan, for
different sizes of companies and different sectors of the economy. These measures are
based on individual accounts of companies harmonized in a standard format. The
results from the pooled cross-section regressions show differences in tax burden, not
only across countries as already identified by the report of the European Commission
on company taxation, but also within countries for different types of companies.
Broadly speaking, the results suggest that large companies bear a smaller tax burden
compared to small enterprises. As size does not seem to significantly influence
profitability before taxes nor the impact of depreciation and interest payment, it is
suggested that large companies are more successful in avoiding taxes, possibly
through tax planning and fiscal engineering. Similarly, the sectors of ‘energy and
water’, ‘building and civil engineering’, and ‘services’ have smaller effective taxation
than the manufacturing industry and the sector of ‘trade’. However, the differences
across sectors could be explained by either a higher degree of competition that
reduces margin or the presence in some of these sectors of public corporations
immune from taxation. Finally, the paper exhibits a ranking of countries for effective
22
taxation controlled for the size, the sector, and the composition of companies'
financial statements.
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Appendix A. Variables definitions and data sources
Balance sheet structural variables
The leverage variable is the log of the ratio between long term debt, and capital plus
provisions.
The current on fixed assets variable is the log of the ratio of these two items.
Both variables are from BACH.
Profit and loss account variables
The effective tax rates are defined as in appendix C.
Staff costs variable is the log of staff costs (wages and social security contributions) in
percentage of turnover.
Value adjustments variable is the log of the sum of value adjustments of fixed and
current assets (including depreciation) in percentage of turnover.
Interest variable is the log of interest payments in percentage of turnover.
The Gross Operating Profit variable is the log of the Gross Operating Profit in
percentage of turnover.
The profit is the log of the profit before taxes in percentage of turnover.
The implicit interest rate is the ratio of the interest paid on total debt.
All variables are from BACH.
Sector and size variables
Sector and size variables are zero-one dummies indicating whether the observed data
relates or not to a specific size or a specific sector as defined in BACH.
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Appendix B. Summary Statistics.
Median Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations
Regression (2)
Effective Tax rate based
on gross operating profit
(%)
14.74 15.42 91.56 -52.83 9.89 2652
Value adjustments
(%turnover)
4.62 6.21 183.94 -36.14 7.51 2652
Interest
(%turnover)
2.87 4.46 137.87 0.00 5.84 2652
Energy and water 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.38 2652
Manufacturing 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.40 2652
Building and civil
engineering
0.18 1.00 0.00 0.38 2652
Trade 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.37 2652
Transport 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.35 2652
Other services 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.35 2652
Small 0.32 1.00 0.00 0.47 2652
Medium 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.47 2652
Large 0.34 1.00 0.00 0.48 2652
Regression (4)
Effective Tax rate based
on profit before taxes
(%)
35.40 30.38 3600.00 -7700.00 263.46 2656
Summary statistics for common sample. The negative minimum value for value adjustment is due to
the possibility of appreciation of assets and other write-offs of former depreciation.
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Appendix C. The BACH database.
Created in 1985 by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, the
Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonized (BACH) presents the financial
structures of non-financial companies, aggregated at various sectors and sizes levels,
in eleven Member States24, the United States and Japan. Data are presented using a
single accounting layout based on the one set in the Fourth Community company-law
Directive (76/660/EEC). BACH data is a compilation of individual (as opposed to
consolidated or group) financial statements of companies, presented in a structured
form. BACH also offers a decomposition made of six main sector classes - Energy
and Water, Manufacturing Industry, Building and Civil Engineering, Trade, Transport
and Communication, and Other Services - based on revised NACE-2 digits
classification.
Sectors
NACE 2DIGITS-REV1 sectoral
codes
ENERGY AND WATER* 10+11+12+23+40+41
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 13+14+15+16+17+18+19+20+2
1+22+24+25+26+27+28+29+30
+31+32+33+34+35+36
BUILDING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING 45
TRADE 50.1+50.3+50.4+50.5+51+52.1-
52.6+55
Transport and communication 60+61+62+63+64
Other services 50.2+52.7+67+70+71+72+73+7
4+75+80+85+90+91+92+93+95
* Also including refining activities.
A distinction by size is made between three categories of companies except the US
where only two size classes are available:
Size class European countries
Million EURO (ECU )
Japan
Million YEN
USA
Million USD
All Sizes All Sizes All Sizes All Sizes
Small Turnover < 7 Capital < 100
Medium 7 =< Turnover < 40 100 < Capital < 1000
small and medium size
Balance-sheet total<25
Large Turnover >= 40 Capital =< 1000 Balance-sheet total>25
Definition of Gross Operating Profit
We have used the Profit and Loss account available in BACH (all items in %-age of
net turnover) to compute effective tax rates. We have named variables in the
following way.
                                                
24 Are missing: Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom.
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PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
OI Net turnover. (operating income)
+ (1) Change in stock finished goods and work in progress.
 + (2) Capitalized production.
+ (3) Other operating income.
= TOI Total operating income.
 - OC
(operating cost)
Costs of materials and consumables.
(Raw materials and consumables + Other external charges).
- (4) Other operating charges and taxes
- EMPL
(employment)
Staff costs.
(Wages and salaries + Social security costs).
= GOP Gross operating profit.
- DEPR Value adjustments on non financial assets + Depreciation on intangible and tangible
fixed assets + Other value adjustments and provisions
= EBIT Net operating profit (Earnings before interest and taxes)
+ FININC Financial income
+ (5) Value adjustments on financial assets
 -FINCH
(financial charges)
Interest and similar charges
(Interest paid on financial debts(INT)+ Other Financial charges)
= EBT Profit on ordinary activities before taxes (earnings before taxes)
+ EXINC Extraordinary income
- EXCH Extraordinary charges
- T Taxes accrued on profit
= NTP Profit or loss for the financial year (net total profit)
Computing effective corporate tax rates
The first option retained as the measurement of effective taxation is the ratio of tax
accrued on gross operating profit:
τ 1  = GOP
T .
This ratio is similar to the one used in macro backward looking studies such as
Martinez-Mongay (2000). The use of gross operating surplus is interesting because it
give profit before depreciation. This is important to obtain a denominator whose
definition does not differ too much from country to country. Indeed, depreciation
rules differ not only in the straight versus declining balance dimension but also on
whether the historical value or the market value of the asset is taken into account.
Therefore, taking gross operating profit allows us to reduce some of the problems due
to differences in accounting methods. Gross Operating Profit is more comparable
between countries than profit on ordinary activities. This rate has been computed per
country, size, industry and year.
The second option is the ratio of tax accrued on profit before taxes (including
extraordinary activities).
τ 2  = EXCHEXINCEBT
T
−+
.
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Table 1.  Tax measures considered as State Aid in the European Union.
AT BE DK FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NL PT ES SW UK EU-15
Manufacturing /
services
Cat. A2 0 112.1 230.3 1.1 453.4 354.3 5.6 426.9 257.8 0 121.6 786.1 0.6 20.0 0 2,769.7
Cat C2 0 0 0 0 21.7 69.8 0 0 0 0 47.5 0 0 0 0 139.1
Of which: SMEs
Cat. A2 0 0.16 0 0 0 203.3 0 0 10.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 213.7
Cat C2 0 0 0 0 0 69.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69.8
Sum of tax State
Aid
0 115.9 230.3 8.8 2221.1 1247.2 5.6 433.6 2061.7 1.8 169.2 788.8 0.6 65.4 26.8 7376.8
As % of Total Aid .00 3.68 13.70 .44 12.46 4.67 .43 40.73 15.15 .83 5.36 51.40 .01 3.65 .35 8.21
As % GDP .000 .051 .148 .008 .171 .065 .005 .549 .193 .011 .048 .781 .000 .030 .002 .096
Total State Aid
to SMEs
67.5 149.7 13.2 69.2 268.3 1,267.8 13.5 4.2 688.5 10.1 21.7 22.6 240.7 37.1 303.3 3,177.2
As % of Total Aid 3.10 4.75 .79 3.47 1.50 4.75 1.03 .39 5.06 4.62 .69 1.47 3.95 2.07 4.01 3.53
As % GDP .036 .066 .008 .060 .021 .066 .012 .005 .064 .059 .006 .022 .046 .017 .024 .042
Total State Aid 2,180 3,152 1,681 1,994 17,829 26,716 1,305 1,065 13,605 218 3,159 1,535 6,086 1,792 7,569 89,885
As % GDP 1.15 1.40 1.08 1.74 1.38 1.39 1.17 1.35 1.27 1.28 .90 1.52 1.15 .82 .60 1.18
Annual average in million euro for 1997-1999. Cat. A2 relates to tax credits, allowances, exemptions, reduced social security payments, and specific tax rates.
Cat. C2 concerns deferred tax provisions. Other non-reported categories are agriculture, fisheries, and regional aid.
 Source: European Commission (2001c), and author's calculations.
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Table 2.  Effective corporate tax rates for small and large companies in 1999 (based on GOP).
Effective Corporate Tax Rate
(based on GOP)
Energy and
Water
manufacturing
industry
Building and
Civil
Engineering
Trade Transport and
Communication
Other services
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large
Austria 8.5 0.5 6.6 14.6 7.6 9.8 7.6 14.0 4.0 19.2 18.7 6.2
Belgium 17.4 8.5 15.1 12.3 15.5 15.0 17.9 20.2 10.2 12.1 18.5 11.5
Denmark 9.7 12.4 11.5 26.7 7.8 13.9 10.1 19.9 3.8 19.9 13.9 18.7
Finland 5.8 16.1 26.4 20.8 17.4 21.2 23.1 20.9 15.1 13.4 24.6 29.8
France 16.7 2.5 18.2 17.4 20.5 7.4 20.3 19.4 16.2 0.6 15.1 12.6
Germany* n.a. n.a. 20.1 23.4 13.0 32.4 16.3 19.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 33.4 14.0 33.8 24.9 36.2 16.3 35.2 25.0 28.7 23.4 37.9 23.0
The Netherlands n.a. 13.8 17.9 18.0 19.1 18.3 21.9 20.0 13.4 10.8 26.0 19.4
Portugal 10.6 18.8 11.1 18.0 14.9 14.1 18.0 20.6 10.0 15.6 n.a. n.a.
Spain 6.4 17.6 16.3 15.6 18.6 13.0 18.4 17.6 21.8 5.4 23.6 n.a.
Sweden* 6.7 5.9 12.6 13.5 10.6 22.7 15.3 15.1 7.3 11.6 16.7 7.7
Japan 24.8 21.4 28.5 15.0 42.1 4.9 31.4 14.4 35.7 9.9 25.8 12.5
USA 11.1 9.9 8.9 22.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
* 1998. Source: BACH and own calculations.
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Table 3.  t-test of differences in means between small and large companies 1990-1999.
Differences across
sizes
Ho: means are equal.
Energy and
Water
manufacturing
industry
Building and
Civil
Engineering
Trade Transport and
Communication
Other
services
Number of degrees of
liberty
199 239 204 183 177 164
Theoretical t-stat (5%
level)
1.972 1.970 1.972 1.973 1.973 1.975
ETR1 (GOP)
Computed t-stat25 1.087 0.492 1.066 0.166 3.035 2.544
Decision Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Reject Reject
ETR2 (Profit)
Computed t-stat 1.525 .664 .389 2.283 1.097 0.310
Decision Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Reject Do not reject Do not reject
Source: 1990-1999 data from BACH and own calculations.
Table 4.  F-test of differences in means across sectors 1990-1999.
Differences across sectors
Ho: means are all equal.
Small companies Large companies
Number of degrees numerator 5 5
Number of degrees denominator 579 587
Theoretical F-stat (5% level) 2.230 2.229
ETR1 (GOP)
Computed F-stat26 4.903 14.378
Decision Reject Reject
ETR3 (profit)
Computed F-stat .810 1.082
Decision Do not reject Do not reject
Source: 1990-1999 data from BACH and own calculations.
                                                
25 The t-stat is computed as 
)11(
2 2121
2
22
2
11
21
221
nnnn
SnSn
t nn
+
−+
+
−
=
−+
µµ
 , where subscripts 1 and 2
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, where n is the total number of observations,
nk is the number of observations in sample k, K is the number of samples, µ is the global average, µk
is the average in sample k, and xI[k] indicates an observation i in sample k.
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Table 5.  Determinants of effective corporate taxation.
Dependent variable:
effective corporate tax rate
On gross operating profit On profit before taxes
(1)
ETR1
(2)
ETR1
(3)
ETR1
3 years
(t to t+2)
(4)
ETR2
(5)
ETR2
3 years
(t to t+2)
Value adjustments -.077*
(.034)
Interest -.236**
(.030)
Sectors and sizes
Energy and water -.632**
(.044)
-.465**
(.044)
-.622**
(.035)
-.408**
(.046)
-1.022**
(.057)
Building and civil engineering -.030
(.024)
-.143**
(.027)
-.022
(.034)
-.117**
(.031)
-.119**
(.044)
Trade .137**
(.021)
-.073*
(.037)
.140**
(.035)
-.034
(.026)
.522**
(.043)
Transport -.552**
(.031)
-.424**
(.034)
-.560**
(.037)
.056
(.040)
-.174**
(.056)
Other services -.140**
(.033)
.024
(.038)
-.111**
(.037)
-.346**
(.045)
-.937**
(.066)
Small companies .153**
(.027)
.205**
(.025)
.156**
(.026)
.166**
(.031)
.292**
(.042)
Medium companies .191**
(.026)
.185**
(.025)
.216**
(.025)
.205**
(.028)
.276**
(.039)
Country fixed effects
Japan 3.418**
(.104)
3.834**
(.087)
3.423**
(.087)
4.477**
(.081)
4.745**
(.103)
Italy 2.940**
(.111)
3.419**
(.097)
2.926**
(.092)
4.420**
(.088)
4.698**
(.127)
Germany 2.995**
(.112)
3.318**
(.092)
3.028**
(.102)
4.141**
(.084)
4.583**
(.109)
Portugal 2.527**
(.121)
3.071**
(.105)
2.513**
(.104)
4.084**
(.104)
4.023**
(.140)
France 2.644**
(.114)
2.967**
(.094)
2.623**
(.093)
3.837**
(.087)
4.157**
(.111)
Spain 2.532**
(.112)
3.028**
(.097)
2.571**
(.093)
3.623**
(.093)
3.451**
(.118)
United States 2.999**
(.128)
2.939**
(.114)
2.970**
(.108)
3.495**
(.100)
4.195**
(.130)
The Netherlands 2.700**
(.111)
3.044**
(.091)
2.669**
(.091)
3.489**
(.087)
3.687**
(.118)
Belgium 2.599**
(.112)
2.985**
(.096)
2.586**
(.097)
3.456**
(.100)
3.520**
(.133)
Finland 2.716**
(.122)
3.027**
(.102)
2.707**
(.124)
3.433**
(.092)
3.620**
(.142)
Denmark 2.689**
(.120)
3.014**
(.104)
2.706**
(.106)
3.322**
(.101)
3.832*
(.116)
Austria 2.080**
(.113)
2.513**
(.093)
2.095**
(.089)
3.252**
(.085)
3.606**
(.109)
Sweden 2.374**
(.120)
2.801**
(.104)
2.303**
(.101)
2.980**
(.109)
2.872**
(.134)
Adj. R² .453 .498 .497 .431 .532
No. of obs. 2626 2491 2237 2460 2120
F-stat 58.256 62.708 62.330 49.981 67.961
Prob (F-stat) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors are given in parentheses. All regressions include unreported time dummies. * and **
indicate significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 6: Determinants of effective corporate taxation (cont.).
Dependent variable: (6)
ETR1
(gross operating profit)
(7)
ETR1
(gross operating profit)
(8)
ETR2
(profit before taxes)
Profit and loss account variables
Value adjustments -.065
(.036)
Interest -.236**
(.032)
Sectors and sizes interacted
Energy and water - small -.506**
(.072)
-.234**
(.059)
-.441**
(.104)
Energy and water - medium -.535**
(.073)
-.374**
(.072)
-.299**
(.067)
Energy and water - large -.834**
(.074)
-.681**
(.072)
-.485**
(.055)
Building and Eng. - small -.202
(.029)
-.081**
(.030)
-.023
(.041)
Building and Eng. - medium .123**
(.035)
.001
(.038)
-.036
(.045)
Building and Eng. - large -.191**
(.043)
-.318**
(.045)
-.289**
(.050)
Trade - small .059*
(.029)
-.054
(.036)
.056
(.040)
Trade - medium .196**
(.023)
.009
(.040)
-.001
(.034)
Trade - large .150**
(.035)
-.134**
(.051)
-.153**
(.034)
Transport - small -.351**
(.035)
-.247**
(.035)
.140*
(.058)
Transport - medium -.447**
(.041)
-.381**
(.041)
.106
(.062)
Transport - large -.846**
(.063)
-.630**
(.067)
-.076
(.070)
Other services - small -.022
(.055)
.262**
(.063)
-.430**
(.066)
Other services - medium -.156**
(.040)
-.007
(.042)
-.177**
(.055)
Other services - large -.229**
(.064)
-.151*
(.070)
-.442*
(.090)
Adj. R² .467 .484 .430
No. of obs. 2626 2491 2460
F-stat 71.225 55.227 57.508
Prob (F-stat) .000 .000 .000
Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors are given in parentheses. Unreported time and country dummies are included. * and **
indicate significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 7: structural variables and companies characteristics.
Dependent
variable:
(9)
Gross
operating
profit (%
turnover)
(10)
Leverage
(11)
implicit
interest
rate
(12)
Interest
(%
turnover)
(13)
Current on
fixed asset
(14)
adjustment
(%
turnover)
(15)
Profit
before
taxes
Sizes
Small -1.052**
(.322)
.363**
(.030)
.067**
(.019)
.056
(.029)
.363**
(.023)
-.035
(.021)
-.007
(.037)
Medium -.659*
(.280)
.061*
(.028)
.007
(.016)
.003
(.052)
.280**
(.021)
-.033
(.022)
.003
(.034)
Sectors
Energy and water 9.202**
(.558)
.446**
(.045)
-.087**
(.025)
.526
(.040)
-1.217**
(.032)
.703**
(.023)
.312**
(.051)
Building and civil
engineering
-2.954**
(.174)
.105**
(.037)
-.500
(.023)
-.270**
(.026)
.813**
(.024)
-.479**
(.021)
-.299**
(.039)
Trade -4.865**
(.167)
.082**
(.029)
-.094**
(.019)
.354**
(.035)
.482**
(.019)
-1.062**
(.021)
-.585**
(.034)
Transport 5.155**
(.431)
.521**
(.034)
-.001
(.022)
.354**
(.035)
-.972**
(.031)
.592**
(.024)
-.285**
(.051)
Other services 3.845**
(.365)
.428**
(.040)
-.087**
(.022)
.534**
(.042)
-.387**
(.031)
.481**
(.033)
.433**
(.050)
Adj. R² .409 .371 .463 .522 .750 .725 .316
No. of obs. 2658 2654 2521 2521 2655 2651 2468
F-stat 74.987 64.213 88.317 111.676 319.184 281.645 47.161
Prob (F-stat) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors are given in parentheses. Regression concerns 1980-1999. Unreported time and country
dummies are included. * and ** indicate significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
